

【翻訳】

Nishi Shinichirō and the Concept of ‘Learning’

解説・英訳 ダニエル・バーク

解説 — 故意に忘れられた知識人

京都大学に通っていた時期、たまには下鴨神社の古本祭りに行く機会があった。ある時、『東洋倫理』という、岩波書店が戦前に出していた濃緑色の文庫本を見つけた。著者は西晋一郎（1873年—1943年）である。大学院生として日本哲学史研究室に在籍していたにもかかわらず、聞いたことのない名前であった。日本における倫理学研究の分野では、西はかなりの大物であることを知った時、少し驚いた。実は、西の生涯は、もう一人「西」を名前にもつ、西田幾多郎（1870年—1945年）とほぼ重なっている。二人の生没年は、わずかに数年の差があるだけだ。西も、西田と同じように、東京帝国大学の哲学科に入学し、ケイベル博士の指導のもと、ヨーロッパ言語や西洋哲学を学んだ。それぞれに哲学のキャリアを積んだ二人は、「両西」と呼ばれたのである。西が師と仰いでいた北条時敬から座禅を勧められたことも、西田との共通点の一つである⁽¹⁾。卒業後、西は、グリーンの『倫理学序説』の翻訳に、日本人として初めて取り組む。この訳書は、西田の『善の研究』よりほぼ十年も早く出版された。『倫理学序説』は、当時よく読まれた哲学書の一つであったが、まだ定訳のない大量の倫理・哲学の用語に満ちた614ページにわたる大著の翻訳は、手間のかかる大仕事であったに違いない。しかしその甲斐あって、西は日本の倫理学界で主要な地位を得ることができた。当時、儒教関係の翻訳や注

積、倫理学や教育の研究は高く評価されたのである。吉田公平によれば、西田よりも西の知名度の方が高かったという時期が、あったらしい⁽²⁾。絶筆となった『人間即家国の説』（1944年）の第一刷は5000冊であったが、すぐに完売したと言われている。

しかし、西田幾多郎と西晋一郎、二人の学者に対する評価は、死後、分岐してしまった。西田は、近年、国内外で盛んに研究され、著作も英語、ドイツ語、フランス語、スペイン語、中国語、韓国語などの様々な言語に翻訳されている。一方、西晋一郎はというと無名に等しい。40冊以上の著書、数々の文章を公表したにもかかわらず、現在、西の本は絶版となり、私が知るかぎり、英訳されたテキストは一つもない。それは何故か。1930—1940年代に刊行された西の著書の題目が示唆している。『我が国体及び国民性について』（1934年）、『教学と思想統一』（1935年）、『真正なる国家』（1939年）、『人間即家国の説』（1944年）。当時、西の本の多くは、国民精神総動員の下に設立された国民精神文化研究所から出版されていた。要するに、西はいわゆる「国体論」を主張する学者であり、戦前の国家主義と関連があった。それゆえに、戦後、西は「故意に忘れられた」のである⁽³⁾。

近年、西に対する評価は再考され始めているようだ。例えば、2018年には、衛藤義則の『西晋一郎の生涯と思想』（広島大学出版会）が刊行された。近代を代表する学者としての名誉回復が期待できるのだろうか。私には予測できない。しかし、西の思想には世に知られる価値がある。その価値とは何であろうか。私見によれば、西の哲学的立場や解釈は、今日の思想傾向とはかなり異なる、だからこそ、西の思想の理解は、現代的解釈の立場を根本的に反省する契機となるかもしれない。真に哲学する学者には、西の立場は哲学として受け入れられない可能性もある。西田は西の思想を、「カント以前、あるいはデカルト以前の独断論である」と見なした⁽⁴⁾。しかしながら、西を今読む意味は、西田のような批判により排除されてしまった思想を再発見し読むという点にあるはずだ。「日本哲学」とは何かという問いがある。この問いについての理解を深めるためにも、「日本哲学」の表

舞台から裏へと迫いやられていた、つまり表ではない「ネガ像」をあえて見ることに意義はあると思われる。

初めて西の思想に触れて以来、私は、そこには再評価に値するものがあると信じてきた。西の思想を英訳し紹介したいという希望を抱き、『東洋倫理』の第一章『学』という概念について』を取り上げ、その翻訳・注解を進めてきた。以下、拙訳を掲げているが、そこで西は「dogma」（独断論）に言及している。西田の批判に対する返答として読むことも可能であろう。

この第一章において、西は、ヨーロッパと東アジアの叡智的・精神的伝統を比較するのだが、彼の教を対象とし実学を重んじる立場は、今日のいわゆる比較哲学とは異質である。比較哲学研究（主に英語圏で行われるもの）は、「哲学」を広義に捉えており、それは世界各地の文明・文化に見られる伝統であると主張する傾向にある。いわゆる「前近代」の日本思想をも哲学と見なす立場は、むしろ今の比較哲学研究の正統であると言えるだろう⁽⁵⁾。哲学の伝統における植民地主義、ヨーロッパ中心主義、あるいは人種差別のような有毒な遺産に向き合おうとする研究者が増えていることの傍証ではないか。歓迎すべき傾向であろう。

ところで、西が重視したのは「哲学」ではない。西にとって「哲学」は「学」の一種である。そもそも、日本の伝統思想には「哲学的」要素が乏しいのであるが、それは、逆に日本の伝統思想は「哲学」より優れているからなのだ。西は主張している。そういうわけで、『東洋倫理』は「倫理」のかわりに、「学」という概念の検討から始まる。第一章は展開される議論のアポロギアとして機能し、西洋と東洋における「学」の根本的違いを明らかにする目的で書かれた。

拙訳に見られるように、西の考えでは、科学や哲学を含めた意味での西洋の「学」は、「学」のための「学」である。このような「学」は抽象的であり、道徳とは無関係な外国からの輸入品である。「東洋の学」は、賢人による「教え」に対する敬愛という別の起源を有している。福沢諭吉は、西洋の科学を「実学」と考えていたようであるが⁽⁶⁾、西は、それは誤解であると言う。真なる「実学」とは東洋の「学」で

ある。人間が生きるということは、抽象的な事柄ではない。真の意味の「学」は、「真理のための真理」を対象とするのではなく、生きる道を指導する「教え」を敬い、それを「習い倣う」学である。

西は西洋思想を単に批判したのではない。西は20世紀の思想家であり、幕末の伝統を擁護する学者はなかった。西洋思想の門外漢であるどころか、西洋の倫理学・哲学を長年研究してきた学者である。それゆえに彼の批判は興味深く、またそこには奇妙な緊張感がある。西は、西洋の学を重視している者に対し、敢えて西洋近代の学術的方法や抽象概念を用いて、日本の伝統に内在する意味を明らかにしようとした。そのために、伝統の優れた点を論じたのである。中国では当時、馮友蘭が中国の伝統思想を「哲学」として再解釈することを試みた⁽⁷⁾。西にとっては、このように西洋起源の「哲学」を支柱として東洋的に概念化するアプローチは、おそらく直ちに東洋の降伏を意味してしまったのである。

西がこのテキストに描き出した「東洋の学」、「西洋の学」に関する主張には、疑問視すべきこともある。しかしそこには、東洋が西洋かという肯定否定の問題を超えた、ある一つの立場から生れた西の解釈や見解を見出すことができるのではないか。また、その当時の立場に接触することで、今日学ぶこともあるのではないか。西の「東西」の視点による伝統の比較研究は、私の見るところ、今日、その正統は何かという問いにつながるものであり、またいわゆる解釈というものの歴史性を浮き彫りにすることにもなるだろう。今でこそ、私たちは自らの観点により、過去を思想を「哲学」として扱うことができるようになった。しかし、そこに潜んでいるのは「西洋の学」の水準の勝利であると、西が今生きていたら、そう指摘するかもしれない。

ところで、西の学者としての博学多識、または作家としての腕前も否めない。西はいわゆる「西洋思想」と「東洋思想」を双方ともに深く理解した上で、自分の立場を語る。アリストテレス、ニュートン、ゲーテ、ポアンカレを参照し、また一方で儒教や仏教の諸概念を駆使する。両伝統を巧みに対象化するに当たり、西は、漢字の語源を解釈しつつ、

両伝統の差異を強調し、あるいは西洋思想を鋭く風刺する。拙訳が、西の大胆な思考スタイルの面白みを少しでもお伝えできるなら、嬉しい限りである。

Translation: Nishi Shinichirō's "On the Concept of 'Learning'" from *Eastern Ethics* (1934, pp. 4-16)

Learning (學), or scholarship, has the meaning of *imitating-and-learning-from*.⁽⁸⁾ Confucius says: "learn and repeat or practice from time to time what you have learned."⁽⁹⁾ Here we find the essence of learning. As it means to imitate, and to learn *from*, since long ago it has been necessary for there to be a model. That is to say, for learning to take place, it is necessary that there also be a teaching (教). Hence we have the word education (教學). In the West, too, we can see this sense. For example, when a given discipline in Germany is referred to as '*lehre*,' this refers to both that which is learnt, the source or model, and *also* the teaching of it. Likewise, when in England a certain theory is referred to as a 'doctrine,' this refers to both the teaching of something, as well as the source or model to be learnt. This is all to say that there must be a teaching in order for learning to take place.

In the West, however, learning corresponds not to teaching, but to truth, having escaped the bonds of the church and returned to the love of wisdom of ancient Greece. *Theoria*, 'to reason,' originally means both the source or model,⁽¹⁰⁾ and to see (能觀) or be seen (所觀).⁽¹¹⁾ That is to say, *theoria* stands in relation to form (形相: shape-aspect), which in turn has a similar meaning to 'idea,' which means form or shape. Everything which exists has form exactly *because* it exists. Without form existence is impossible. Just what is, as it is, without any distortion or concealment, in its full shape, its truth (真相: real-aspect), is the 'idea.' *Theoria* is to look at this true form, and is, counter-wise, the truth of the form as perceived.

Coincidentally, the Chinese word for principle (理) closely resembles 'idea.' Principle is the grain of jade and stones; it is pattern, that is, form. Hence truth (真理: real-principle) doubtlessly means the "real" (真) form, shape, aspect. Reason (条理) has a similar meaning, and from this we can see the connection with words such as law (order) (理法) and law (rule) (法則). However, law as order or rule is still related to the previously mentioned 'teaching.' Between learning which stands in relation to teaching, and learning which takes truth as its target, there remains a conceptual gap which is not easily bridged.

Learning as the love for wisdom, the love of truth, is the pursuit of the 'idea' by means of 'theoria.' The aim is to look upon things as they truly are, in their full and perfect forms. We may say that to 'look' or to 'see' constitutes the very spirit of Greek learning. This brings with it an accompanying concern with the beautiful, or the aesthetic. Certainly, the 'idea' is more something to be seen than it is to be thought about, and 'theoria' is that act of 'seeing' itself.

'Seeing' thus takes on an artistic character when differentiated from 'thinking.' Forms are seen, rather than considered, and hence it is the forms which are beautiful. That which is beautiful is none other than the perfected forms. The incomplete figure is not a figure, the imperfect form is not a true form. The true form, therefore, is that which is doubtlessly beautiful to behold. The truth, the *shinri* (真理) sought after by Greek learning is therefore the true aspect, the *shinsō* (真相), the true *form* (真形相),⁽¹²⁾ In other words, truth, for the Greeks, is none other than the beautiful.

Linked in this manner to both Greek art and Greek learning, the Greek love of wisdom was necessarily the 'eros' which seeks out the beautiful. The state depicted in Plato's *Republic* was the perfect form of the state, in other words the state as a grand work of art. Likewise, the

various virtues discussed in Aristotle's ethics are forms of the beautiful soul, and thus also art.

It is natural that the learning of modern Western nations is concerned above all with 'theoria,' given that they left behind the teaching-oriented scholarship of the middle-ages with their return to the Greeks. When at the beginning of his scientific treatise Poincaré states that there is nothing more beautiful than truth, he is articulating the spirit of Western scholarship. The beautiful - in other words the complete form - is the perfect form, it lacks nothing, being complete in itself, with nothing left to seek that is exterior to it. In this conception we find the reason for the promotion of learning for the sake of learning.

It is here that 'love of truth' is declared supreme, with merely expedient methods firmly rejected, and so-called 'teachings' expelled from the world of learning. And so, today scholars of our country are coming to think of the above sense of 'learning' as the only true learning, with 'teaching' seen as so-called 'dogma.' Here, 'dogma,' is that which is 'dogmatic' or arbitrary, running counter to the spirit of learning. Yet the spirit of Greek learning, as well as the ideal of modern Western learning, which resonates with, and is a restoration of the Greek spirit, is from long ago *one* ethos of learning. It is not the only ethos. It is no more than the Western style. More specifically, it is only their ancient concept of learning, as we must distinguish it from the spirit of the European Middle-Ages.

To take one concept of learning alone as truth, with other ways of learning rendered un-truth, is already one-sided. Yet it is not only one-sided, and therefore mistaken. It also means the taking of something from a people different to us, from a history different to our own, as that which is true, with what is our people's way, our own history, rendered as false. This is not merely to make a mistake, but to truly overturn and confuse the self and other, the local and foreign.

Our learning, however, is to learn-and-receive-instruction.⁽¹³⁾ It is a learning which stands in a correspondence with 'teaching.' The purely theoretical is an aesthetic construction, and as a result it is both unreal (非現実的) and beyond the real (超現実的). Learning which is concerned with the theoretical seeks the completion of conceptual structures. Whether it is science or philosophy, the essential quality of such learning is 'symbolism.'

Such a learning is truly but another form of art. The perfect forms of nature⁽¹⁴⁾ are beautiful, just as works of art are beautiful. Just as the truth (true-aspect) of nature is what is true, the perfected structure of thinking is also what is true. Because theoretical physics is a 'symbolism' which attempts to faithfully represent natural physical phenomena by way of theoretical constructs, it allows for various theories to be regarded as 'truth.' In the world of pure theory, of pure mathematics, this is even further still the case. Here also arise the various 'truths' of geometry. Hence it is learning for the sake of learning, truth for the sake of truth.⁽¹⁵⁾

However, learning which stands in relation to teaching is concerned with the real, with the actual. In general, learning in the East is practical-learning (実學: real-learning), not mere theory.⁽¹⁶⁾ It means examining actual problems of living; religious, moral, and political, from a practical standpoint. It does not necessarily entail perfected theoretical structures. That elements which would be essential for a theoretical system are missing is merely because such elements are not needed for practical purposes. That Confucianism is lacking in a philosophical system is simply because such a system is not considered necessary from a practical standpoint. Even in the case of Buddhist teaching, which compared to Confucianism is far richer in theory, and even in the case of such concepts as 'yuishiki-ron' (the theory that nothing exists out of the mind), which could be thought

of as an introductory text to Buddhist philosophical theory, the fact that elements which would be essential for a proper epistemology or psychology appear to be missing, indicates that such elements were thought to be unnecessary for guiding individuals towards the ultimate goal of spiritual liberation. In Buddhism, too, theory is conducted not for the sake of theory, but for the purpose of teaching people the greater truth of life that is religious.

Even Buddhist sutras, which are structured as though created with artistic intentions, arise from an attitude of religious reverence. Of course, philosophically organized Buddhist systems were developed later, and as a result of their influence quite philosophical theorizing developed within Confucianism. Nevertheless, [these traditions] maintained their orientation towards 'teaching.' It is in the Eastern style of learning to be continuously alert to the need to purge 'empty theories' that result from turning too far to abstract reasoning, and to tirelessly reflect on the proper province of practical learning (実學).

And so, naturally, within this tradition we have necessarily focused on seeking to disclose the truth of this world and this life. Certainly, a person is nothing without truth, to say nothing of the problems of truth which arise in serious undertakings such as religion, morality, and governance. However, we speak here not of truth for the sake of truth. We set out with a sincere, practical need to inquire into truth for the sake of resolving the real problems of life: How are we to achieve ultimate peace? How are we to bring harmony and security to the people? How are we to achieve right conduct? We seek after truth for the sake of, and insofar as, it helps us with these concrete needs.⁽¹⁷⁾

Truth for the sake of truth means to halt at the merely 'correct,' content to enjoy its beauty.⁽¹⁸⁾ We do not think that it is valuable to know as much as possible about anything at all. Nor do we think that considering what is beneficial or harmful to human life is to treat insight into

truth in a vulgar, expedient manner. Truth itself is neither beneficial nor harmful. It is merely what is true. Eastern learning, which we may also refer to as actual-learning (実學), is oriented towards the practical living of human life, and the seeking of knowledge which may help us *accomplish* our lives. This is why we set up a 'teaching.' To *learn-and-receive-instruction from* 'teaching' is precisely what constitutes 'learning.' Newton once compared the truth to a great ocean.⁽¹⁹⁾ It is impossible to conquer such an ocean. Nor is it necessary. There is only the problem of how we are to set sail upon it, how we are to voyage across it, and how we are to arrive safely at our chosen shore, thereby accomplishing our lives.⁽²⁰⁾

Saints, sages, and prophets have appeared over the ages, rising above the common man. That we may accomplish our lives, they have pointed out to us the shore we are to aim for; they have taught us the harbors we are to depart from; and they have instructed us in the art of navigation. Such is why the first teachings were founded. As a teaching, it must be erected. It does not, like the truth, simply depend upon nature (天然). From amongst countless truths, those crucial for the accomplishment of human life were chosen, and shown to the people. For this reason, 'teaching' has stood amidst the true from long ago, yet is a human artifice. Learning in the East has meant, initially and first of all, to follow this teaching, and to learn from it. The way to learning was not opened up by a 'love of truth,' but by a veneration for teaching. Hence it is not truth for the sake of truth, or learning for the sake of learning, but truth for the sake of accomplishing life, learning for the sake of praxis.

This is why veneration is the basis of Eastern learning. It is because we venerate teachings, and venerate those who teach us, that we seek to learn, to imitate. This is learning, and it does not stem from love of truth. Love of truth has long been thought of as deeply

moral. However, to yearn for truth as that which is the most beautiful, is so-called 'eros'; it is not yet deeply moral. Lusting for knowledge has never been fruitful, yet when arising from personal cravings it is no more than naked individualism, easily confused with the desire to know itself.

And so, individuals who understand learning in a Western way, as I see it, often take learning as beginning with lust for knowledge. As a result, they stray far from the true essence of learning, and do not even achieve the standpoint of 'eros.' However, such misunderstandings, and ultimately, 'eros' and desire for knowledge, too, stem from individualism. Because, in the East, learning begins with respect and veneration, it is without the motivation of individualism, but to the contrary first begins with the devotion of oneself. Ultimately, because such learning has a moral starting point, it also becomes a moral love-of-truth. Learning which seeks the path to accomplishing life entails the trusting of those who teach the way in its search for truth. There is no love of truth so great that it alone can win out over learning which is based on veneration.

The spirit of veneration in human beings begins with the spirit of the child towards its parents. This is the spirit of filial piety. The very first learning of humans after they are born is that of the child learning from its parents. We may say that learning begins and ends with filial piety. Concretely, to accomplish one's life means to begin with filial piety, to end with devotion; to work piously for the benefit of society, and to give thanks for the blessings of the gods of heaven and earth. There is nothing more important than to seek out how one may be filial to one's parents, loyal to one's monarch and nation, and benevolent to the people.

As the motivation of this learning is different, the results must also be different. One is theory for the sake of theory, learning for the

sake of learning. The other is real (practical) learning (実學). One casts individual truths into the great ocean, failing to discern a safe harbor. The other receives the teaching of the sages and masters, respecting their guidance in order to advance. One supposes that we might directly beseech the truth, that is, nature. The other understands that we must first beseech the refined man, who beseeches the wise man, who beseeches the sage, who beseeches heaven.⁽²¹⁾ One is individualistic, with the direct contact of the self with reality, the participation of the self with the truth of the universe, seen as the greatest good. As a result, we have ten theories for ten people, a hundred theories for a hundred people, and yet conversely there is ultimately nothing which is capable of going beyond the tradition of national culture, or ethnic sentiment. Another rejects individualism, seeking the path by way of the guidance of teachers. As a result it is conservative and traditional, yet this does not mean that it necessarily shuts out the creativity of the individual and their original perspectives.

However, if an individual is to simply pursue truth for the sake of truth, then the world of truth is opened up such that ethics becomes ethics, governance becomes governance, religion becomes religion, art becomes art, and so forth, each in accordance with its own laws comes to form its own cultural region.⁽²²⁾ However, a resolute learning, which attempts to reverently accomplish life, is oriented towards an integral (unified) culture, wherein the unified principle of all things is realized. Religion, morality, governance, economics, scholarship, art, all are united by a single governing principle. First of all, in learning, we stress that the undertaking of learning is not divided.

Learning which originates with a love-of-truth, which in turn stems from an 'eros' that seeks after beauty, and views nothing so beautiful as the truth, requires self-expression. It is possible to claim that such a learning is actually like an art-work, formed out of conceptual

thinking. Goethe is doubtlessly the greatest of self-expressionists. That all Germans sing Goethe's praise is only natural. How could an individualistic people help but praise the most majestic of self-expressionists? Yet learning which takes veneration and respect as its starting point, learning which is focused on the problem of finding what to aim for in life, learning which takes the esteeming of resolution as its spirit, such a learning requires not self-expression but *praxis*. Whether we speak of veneration, or of resolution, this already means self-*devotion*. The beginning is at the same time the end. True *praxis* is achieved through offering up the self.

In general, Eastern learning entails the goal of cultivating oneself in order to govern the people.⁽²³⁾ *Self-enlightenment enlighten-ment-of-other* (自覚覚他, a Buddhist term) has this same meaning. We do not honor wise men who merely preserve their own social positions, to speak nothing of the self-expressionists. Even when single-mindedly inquiring into the self, we do not stop at the attainment of personal peace. This is because, at the base of self-inquiry is a benevolence towards all people. Because self-expression takes its own self-expression as whole in itself, learning based on self-expression is learning for the sake of learning; that is, its essence is to end in ethics. Because learning which begins with self-devotion necessarily tends towards *praxis*, the activity of learning cannot be divorced from the greater undertaking of human life. The former learning is artistic, the latter is moral. That which is mere 'eros' attempts to make even morality artistic. That which is reverential makes even art into what is moral.

To say that art is made moral, means that poetry, song and music spring from loyalty and devotion, with all creation reflected in loyal and devoted eyes. This is the unity of morality and art. In unifying the undertaking of learning, we make it the learning of governance and teaching. That is to say, there is nothing which is moral separate

from the practical activity of governing, ruling, and managing. That is why we speak of cultivating oneself in order to govern the people, and of *self-enlightenment enlightenment-of-others*. This means the unity of religion, teaching, and morality. In this manner, following from the essence of Eastern learning, we can understand that the religious, the moral, the artistic, the political, the economical, these, all, are fundamentally tied together. Here, the fundamental unity of a culture takes place, meaning the unity of human life. The concrete realization of such unity is the unity of the nation. Conversely, it is how we can know why it is true to say that learning must be faithful to the nation. We must understand that how we look at learning is not merely a problem concerning only learning. It concerns the whole of life, and, most practically, has a supreme importance when it comes to the continued existence of the nation.

While [in this book] my subject is Eastern ethics, the delimitation of ethics into its own separate sphere is already to copy a foreign, Western custom. For us, there is, originally, only *one* learning. The learning of ethics and morality cannot exist apart from governance and economy. Furthermore, if religion and art are not also included, we cannot truly call it human, moral learning. Needless to say, the division of the subjects of learning, investigating their essences individually, has allowed for a great advancement in learning, and the multifaceted opening up of the world of truth. Yet it also serves to render unclear the aims of life, leaving us with the threat that when we ask what these aims ultimately are, we will lack the conviction to answer.

There are scholars in our country today who, having accepted self-expressionistic Western style learning for the sake of learning, take this learning as the only proper learning. Such thinking is not only shallow, but runs against our own temperament; it is not harmonious with our own historical culture, like patching wood onto bamboo. The

effects of such imported thinking cannot be underestimated when it comes to matters of national education. Between learning for the sake of learning, and learning which is loyal to the country, there is the difference that exists between art and morality. For the sake of an integral life, this is a decisive difference. Hence why I have had to devote so many words to the concept of learning.

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注

- (1) 西と西田の関係については、縄田次郎『西晋一朗の生涯と思想』（2003年、56-89頁）を参照のこと。
- (2) 吉田公平「序」、同上（縄田、ii-iii）。
- (3) 同上。
- (4) 同上、85頁。
- (5) 英語圏における比較哲学（comparative philosophy）の一般的な理解については、Julian Baggini, *How the World Thinks: A Global History of Philosophy* (Granta, 2018) が参考になる。Baggini は、哲学を世界という視点から捉え、また「文化の現象」として理解している。これは、1930年代にハワイ大学で始まった欧米的な comparative philosophy の方法に由来する。哲学を「文化の現象」と捉えたハワイ大学の研究者らによる伝統的哲学の理解は、アメリカのプラグマティズムと深い関係があり、また19世紀に発展した人類学、社会学、実証主義、ダーウィンの進化論からの強い影響も受けている。そこで、ヘルダーが18世紀に生物を通して文化を論じていたことが思い出されるが、哲学は広義の anthropology を原型としなければならないという彼の発想は、*How the World Thinks* で Baggini が表明した現代の比較哲学の立場を裏づけるものだと考えられる。ヘルダー研究については、John H. Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (2002) を参照のこと。
- (6) 福沢による「実学」の思想を論じた文献として、丸山真男著・松沢弘陽編『福沢諭吉の哲学 他六編』（岩波文庫、2001年、特に36-66頁）、Carmen Blacker, *The Japanese Enlightenment: A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (Cambridge University Press, 1964, pp.41-56) がある。
- (7) Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy Vol. I & II*, trans. by Derk Bodde, Princeton University Press, 1952.

(8) 倣ひ習ふ: Nishi combines two homonym verbs in Japanese to help make his point. Narau (倣う), which means to copy, to imitate, and Narau (習う), which means to lean *from* somebody. That they are written differently indicates their different sense, but putting them together helps to emphasize their common heritage and connection. This emphasize prepares the reader for the reference to Confucius in the next sentence.

(9) This quote is from the first line of the *Analects of Confucius*: 學而時習、不亦說乎. The English translation used here is from Wing-Tsit Chan's *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy* (1963), p. 18. For the Japanese translation, see 金谷治 (訳注) 『論語』岩波文庫、1963, p. 19.

(10) We saw above that Nishi takes proper 'learning' as *imitating-and-learning-from*. What Nishi calls the original source or base of what is learnt (本), ought to be a model (手本 – lit "hand-book" - Etymology: a book for practicing the correct writing of characters) to be emulated (here we have another play on words). Yet in Nishi's view the Greeks take a different path, which he wishes to contrast Eastern learning with. As we shall see further below, what he argues is that instead of *imitating-and-learning-from*, the Greeks wish to *see*. And instead of a *model* to emulate, what they *see* is the forms.

(11) Now Nishi is using Buddhist terminology for 'see.' 能觀 (nōkan: to see) and 所觀 (shokan: to be seen), appear in the *Shōbōgenzō*, by Zen master Dōgen. These terms refer to something like the viewing of the normally perceptible, temporary world of the senses. They stand in contrast to 當觀 (tōkan), which indicates something like a form of sight which is neither *seeing* nor *being seen*, but a sight that transcends the division between self and other. Dōgen states that such a form of sight cannot be achieved by way of regular knowledge, which depends upon this division between self and other, between seeing, and being seen. We can see here how simply by use of a couple of Chinese characters, Nishi is already able to foreshadow his attack on the Greeks, implicitly accusing them of being occupied with the

unimportant.

(12) In modern Japanese, there are several different words for truth: 真理, 真実, 真相. Each includes the character 真 (shin), which means something like the ‘real’ or ‘the actual.’ We have seen Nishi assert that Greek learning is concerned not with teaching, but with truth as ‘idea.’ He agrees that yes, Eastern learning too has its ‘idea’ in the form of principle (理). Yet he claims that this principle stands in relation to *teaching*. The Greek idea, meanwhile, is not this kind of principle, but form. And so, Greek truth is not truth in the sense of true-principle (真理), but truth as true-aspect (真相). Nishi is able to use these different ways of writing ‘truth’ in order to help distinguish what he views as the difference in the orientations of Greek and Eastern learning.

(13) 學び習ふ: Here Nishi combines two Japanese verbs Manabu (study, learn 學ぶ) and Narau (習う), to form the expression *learn-and-receive-instruction*, allowing for him to emphasize the dual nature of this older sense of learning. At the same time, we are reminded of the beginning of the *Analects*. For Japanese readers of the time, the connotation would have worked nicely.

(14) 天地自然の完相: Of course, nature is an inadequate translation for tenchi-shizen (天然自然). This is an old term, indicating something closer to “the ways of the cosmos.” It appears in the set phrase tenchi-shizen-no-kotowari (天地自然の理), the principles of the cosmic order, which govern all things (including human life). Nishi has substituted 理 (principle - kotowari) with 完相 (complete-form), and, in the next sentence, with 真相 (true-aspect). So we have here instead: “the *complete form* of the ways of the cosmos.” Nishi is again playfully using concepts from Eastern thought to underscore how he takes the Greeks as not oriented towards truth as principle which requires teaching, but truth as perfect form, which is to be looked upon.

(15) 學のための學、真理のための真理: This phrase appears frequently throughout the essay.

(16) We should be aware that the term *Jitsugaku* (実學), ‘real-learning’ or ‘practical-learning’, which forms a word pair with *kyogaku* (虚學: false

learning), was frequently used in scholarly debates between different traditions in China, Japan and Korea from the 17th century onwards. In stating that Eastern learning is “practical” learning, Nishi can indicate that Greek learning is the equivalent of “false” learning. Later he will be more explicit.

(17) The word ‘truth’ is repeated six times in this paragraph. In each case, what Nishi actually writes is 真理. Yet, we ought to be aware that this translation is potentially very misleading here. The connotation of the two composing characters is important. Truth here means *real-principle*, or *true-principle*, *genuine-principle*. For Nishi, ‘truth’ in this sense is inherently practical, helping us find the *way* (道) to live. It is not merely the counterpart to ‘what is true.’

(18) 「真理のための真理といふは真に安んじ美を楽しむといふ意味である」: Nishi uses the first half of ‘truth’ as “true-principle” (真). What is missing, of course, is the second half; principle (理); i.e. what is missing is concern for the (moral) principles which may inform our conduct.

(19) “I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.” See Brewster, *Memoirs of Newton* (1855).

(20) Nishi’s reading of Western learning appears similar to Nietzsche’s in a number of respects, particularly as found in *The Birth of Tragedy*. This similarity extends to the analogy of ocean and shore: “The whole of our modern world is caught up in the net of Alexandrian culture, and its ideal is theoretical man, armed with the highest powers of knowledge and working in the service of science ... [yet] modern man has begun to sense the limitations of the Socratic delight in knowledge, and yearns for a shore from the wide and barren sea of knowledge.” (p. 86)

(21) I note that this hierarchical structure characterizing traditional (i.e. Neo-

Confucian) learning had been criticized many decades earlier by Fukuzawa Yukichi, who incidentally also used the term ‘real learning’ or ‘practical-learning’ (実學), although for opposite ends. For Fukuzawa, Confucian learning was not practical, but helplessly moralistic and divorced from a scientifically knowable and controllable nature. It was Western science which was the ‘実學’ that Japan needed to modernize and survive. In his famous series of pamphlets *An Encouragement of Learning*, which predate Nishi’s book by 62 years, Fukuzawa writes that: ‘Heaven does not create people above others, or below others.’ Reading Nishi, meanwhile, it is almost as though he were in dialogue with Fukuzawa. Familiar with western philosophy to a degree not yet possible in Fukuzawa’s day, Nishi wishes to deploy his knowledge to reclaim the term ‘実學’ for native traditions.

(22) Here too, I suggest that we can see a similar sentiment in *The Birth of Tragedy*. “...without myth all culture loses its healthy and natural creative power: only a horizon surrounded by myths can unify an entire cultural movement. [...] Let us now, by way of comparison, imagine abstract man, without the guidance of myth – abstract education, abstract morality, abstract justice, the abstract state; let us imagine the lawless wandering, unchecked by native myth, of the artistic imagination; let us imagine a culture without a secure and sacred primal site, condemned to exhaust every possibility and feed wretchedly on all other cultures – there we have our present age, the product of that Socratism bent on the destruction of myth.” (pp. 109-110) – Where Nietzsche speaks of myth, Nishi would speak of teaching. For Nishi, the teaching of the Eastern saints and sages would perform a similar function, of providing a secure horizon within which culture can be a ‘unified’ whole.

(23) 己を修め人を治めること: From the *Great Learning* (大學), one of the “Four Books” of Confucianism, selected by Zhu Xi in Song period China as foundational texts, and used in the national examination system.